The article analyses situations and modalities through which the Italian penal system reacted to the terrorism of the 1970’s. Given the outright impossibility to adopt the legislative solutions of other countries (specifically Western Germany), the Italian judges, who were involved in the fight against terrorism, became the main actors of the first phase of an Italian response to terrorism and focused on the elaboration of interpretative solutions. At a later stage, the task to inspire this penal legislation was given to the internal ministry, who exploited the instrument of emergency establishment in order to impose necessary and also incoherent measures. In the last phase, which started with the kidnapping of the Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party Aldo Moro in 1978, a strategical and oriented intervention was developed. It was based on the individuation of a double platform of intervention: the aggravation of sanctions and the introduction of special discounts on sanctions for those who chose to collaborate. The last part of this contribution, shows how the penal solutions adopted in Italy in the 1970’s represented an example, with an internal and external circulation of knowledge, adopted to face other National emergencies and to fight terroristic threats.
Keywords: Emergency legislation; Turin trial; Counter-terrorism.