Asia Maior in 2017: The unravelling of the US foreign policy in Asia and its consequences

This essay, based on the articles included in Asia Maior XXVIII/17 and additional sources, singles out as the most significant developments in Asia during 2017 the havoc caused by the policies launched by the newly elected US president, Donald Trump, and the reaction of the main Asian powers to his policies. In 2017, Trump replaced his predecessor’s well-conceived global policy aimed at containing and «taming» China, with a set of half-baked «America-first» strategies. Their lodestar was the disdain of the role of international organisations, the refusal of the responsibilities inherent in the US position as global hegemon, and the implementation of neo-protectionist policies. This translated into the US’s withdrawal from the TPP, and the attempt at imposing on the US’s trade partners bilateral agreements forcing them to diminish or eliminate their favourable trade balances. The upheaval caused by these policies was further promoted by Trump’s approach to North Korea and Iran. The US President took an uncompromising stand on North Korea and its nuclear ambitions, without, however, individuating any reasonable means to either force or convince Pyongyang to deescalate its aggressive strategy. Even more worrying was the case of Iran. The signing of the pact limiting the Iranian nuclear programme (JCPOA), stabilising one of the more dangerous geopolitical areas in the world, had been one of the successes of the previous administration. Trump, however, announced his decision to disavow the JCPOA. The situation of uncertainty created by the Trumpian strategy could not but create a void of power worldwide. In Asia, it was filled by the activism of the US’s main challenger, China, and two of the US’s closest allies, Japan and India. China presented itself as the new champion of globalization, while, at the same time, claiming a more expansive global security role, commensurate with its growing importance. On their part, Japan and India strived to supply the absence of any meaningful American leadership. They joined hands in launching an Asian-African Growth Corridor, which was technically similar to the China-sponsored Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and in obvious competition with it. Japan also assumed the initiative in trying to keep afloat the TPP minus the US. India, on its part, openly confronted China along their common Himalayan border, moving into the Doklam Plateau (namely a non-Indian territory, disputed between Bhutan and China), where China was building an all-whether highway. Eventually, after a two-months risky confrontation, the armies of the two countries suddenly vacated the Plateau. It was a strategic victory for India, as China gave up the construction of the disputed road.

Michelguglielmo Torri | University of Turin | mg.torri@gmail.com